The Russo - Ottoman War 1787: Research Paper
Introduction
The Russo-Ottoman War of 1787 is among the most important wars in European history. Yet the War has been systematically neglected by historians and very limited research or historical data exist, that could support the causes and effects of the 18th century war between the Ottomans and Russians. The important outcomes of the War is that it set the historical relationship between Russia and England. The war highlighted trade relationships and commercial interests of the European nations in the Ottoman Empire (Panzac Daniel . International and Domestic Maritime Trade in the Ottoman Empire during the 18th Century. International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2. 1992, pp. 189-206). It exposed the naval and military strengths and weaknesses of the Ottoman Empire and the strengths and weaknesses of the Russia and its allies. The war is important for its historical, commercial and social significance as it was turning point in history and highlights the significance of Ottoman history, and provides insights on the broader Ottoman relations with Europe, including Russia.
The cumulative impact of military, economic, social, political and administrative challenges in the Empire at the end of the eighteenth century obliged the Ottomans to accept the imperative of reform. Reforms became the cornerstone of the Ottoman leadership during the late 18th century and reforms encompassed military and naval operations (Eversley, G. Shaw-Lefevre (George Shaw-Lefevre), Baron, 1832-1928.; Chirol, Valentine, Sir, 1852-1929.;The Turkish Empire : from 1288 to 1914. London : T. Fisher Unwin, 1923). These reforms at first produced only superficial changes, however more radical results were seen as reforms were aggressively implemented.
The Iaşi treaty ended the war with Russia in 1792, and Sultan Selim III approached prominent men and asked them to issue memoranda on the new order that could be implemented in the Ottoman Empire. The Russo - Ottoman War brought with it several changes and among these changes are a new order and implementation of further reforms under Sultan Slim (Naff, Thomas . Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy in the Reign of Selim III, 1789-1807. Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 83, No. 3, pp. 295-315).
The thesis of the paper highlights the analytical aspects of the war, that the Ottoman relationship with Russians was closely connected to European provocation by British, European trade policies and international politics. Russia saw this as an opportunity to advance its Greek project, which is annexation of large territories beyond the Black sea.
This historical analysis provides the Russian motive, both for War and Peace and the Ottoman strengths and weaknesses, following the failure of reforms in the Ottoman military and weakening of their control over Arab regions. The war of 1787 is significant in that it highlights a major historical shift from Arab dominance to Eastern European dominance, Russia's rise as a superpower and the expanse of trade interests of the British Empire. It also forms the historical basis of the decline of the Ottoman Empire in the future years to come.
Historiographical Review
The historiographical review presented here draws on sources such as monographs by Ottoman historians, books, journal articles and Ottoman historical and political writing. The article by Aksan Virginia H presented in the International Journal of Middle East Studies (1993) highlighted the political aspects of the historical war. The monographs by Sir Valentine Chirol and Lord Eversley provided a detailed description of the history of the Turkish Empire from 13th to the early 20th century. Hanioğlu's analyses presented a history of the Late Ottoman Empire, including commercial and trade interests of the Empire. The Austrian and Russian Alliance was further reviewed and analysed by Mayer Matthew who presented the historical basis of the Ottoman War. Miller presented the power and governance of the Ottoman Empire In the 18th century and presented a paper in the historical review. Naff, Thomas elaborated on reforms and Ottoman Diplomacy during the Reign of the Sultans, including the Reign and contributions of Sultan Selim..Military Reform and the Problem of Centralization in the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century were further discussed by Avigdor. Panaite Viorel .presented a monograph on Ottoman Law during war.Panzac Daniel (1992) elaborated on maritime Trade and commercial activity in the Ottoman Empire. Other monographs by prominent Ottoman historians discussed the rise and fall of the Ottoman Empire in the context of Turkey's past, present and future.
Historical Background: The Russo - Ottoman War
The XVIII century appeared a turning point in the history of many Oriental and Occidental states. It was significant for the history of the nations that were part of the Ottoman Empire at the time. The huge late medieval state presented a complex conglomerate of nations and tribal unions, varying from one another in terms of their social and economic development and their ethnic and religious structure. Within such an imperial community, the production and sociocultural ties remained loose, which predetermined varying orientations and unlikely pace of social advancement in different parts of the Empire.
The Turkish ruling circles found Russia the principal originator of unrest of the Balkan Christians and Russia became the main bone of contention and conflict. This is why the contradictions between the two empires resulted in most cases in armed conflicts in the second part of the XVIII century. France and England capitalized on this and strengthened their influence on the Sultan government. Of all the European states they had the most extensive commercial interests in the Ottoman Empire.
The French owned the rich trading posts in the ports of Levant. On the quays of Beirut or Izmir one would rather hear French language being spoken than Turkish. By the end of the XVIII century the annual trade turnover of France and the Ottoman Empire reached 50-70 million livres; this exceeded the total trade turnover of the rest of the European states. The English maintained sound economic positions in Turkey, particularly on the Turkish coast of the Persian Gulf. The British trading post in Basra, being affiliated to the East-Indian company, became a monopolist in purchasing raw materials. In this period France and England being involved in the colonial wars in America and India didn’t aim to immediately take possession of the territories of the Ottoman Empire. They preferred to support the power of the sultan, being most suitable to them in terms of their commercial expansion. No other state and no other government that might have replaced the Ottoman ruler would have created such vast opportunities of unconstrained trade for foreign traders. This resulted in an explicitly hostile attitude of France and England to the liberation movements of the “oppressed nations” of the Ottoman Empire; this was largely the reason of their opposition to the Russian advancement to the Black Sea and the Balkans.
The central feature of the late Ottoman Empire was reform. Abdul Khamid I was one of the most successful traditionalist Ottoman reformers from the times of Murad IV (ruled in 1623-1640), that strived to renew the Empire by restoring its ancient institutions, alongside with creating the new combat arms and equipping the army with modern weapons. Abdul Khamid I strived to modernize janissary corps and the navy. (Levy Avigdor . Military Reform and the Problem of Centralization in the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century. Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Jul., 1982), pp. 227-249). This has been extensively documented by historians.
Under the command of Admiral Hazi Hasan-pasha modern ships were constructed, many Ottoman seamen and officers were trained the latest European techniques of conducting naval operations. With the help of baron de Tott, a European serving the Ottomans, new artillery corps of a European type were created and the outdated mining and engineering units were reorganized. The government opened higher schools in engineering, mathematics and fortification for the purpose of training the Ottoman officers. An interesting fact is that the training was carried out by the officers from Europe. (Miller, W. . Europe and the Ottoman Power before the Nineteenth Century. The English Historical Review, Vol. 16, No. 63 (Jul., 1901), pp. 452-471) and especially from France.
France supported this policy and sent a huge number of experts hoping that the restoration of the power of the Ottoman Empire would stop the expansion of Russia towards the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. But in 1785 Khalil Hamid-pasha was deposed and executed through the slander of the court nobility that forced Abdul-Khamid into believing that Khalil Hamid-pasha was preparing a plot for the purpose of his deposition and enthroning prince Selim. In 1787 the Russians convinced the French to quit assisting the Ottomans and recall their experts. After those events the reforms slowed down. Therefore the outdated military and administrative system was not effectively reformed. The incomplete reforms caused confusion, which is detrimental to the army, and in this case appeared one of the key factors of the military failure of the Ottomans in the 1787-1792 campaign.
Sultan Abdul Khamid I inherited a war against Russia from his brother (1768-1774) and finally he was compelled to sign the Kyuchuk-Kajnardzhi peace treaty (1774). It granted Russia the right to have the navy forces in the Black Sea and thus spread its influence across the non-Muslim legies of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and Crimea. Russia agreed that the Crimean Tatars should recognize the power of the sultan being head of the Muslim clergy. This enabled the sultan to exercise a political influence on the Tatars. And still the treaty was by far unfavorable to the Ottoman Empire which meant that continuous cessation of arms wasn’t ensured.
Ekaterina II in her turn was obsessed with an ambitious idea of restoring a Christian monarch in Constantinople. Her plan is known in history as the “Greek Project”. After the Crimea was taken over by Russia in 1783 this plan arrests the empress’s mind to an extent that she conceives this idea as an attainable foreign policy in the nearest future. Ekaterina II was encouraged by the fact that alongside with solving the issue of opening the gateway to the Mediterranean, she fulfilled the critical mission of liberating the Christian nations from the “Muslim Ottoman yoke”. Ekaterina being convinced in the attainability of the mission found a suitable person for the role of the emperor of Constantinople. The second son of Pavel Petrovich, heir to the Russian throne, was the one for the role. His name by a symbolic coincidence was Constantine. In 1782 Ekaterina wrote to Austrian emperor Josef: “I am deeply convinced that having boundless trust to Your Royal Majesty, success in the warfare for liberating Europe form the fiend of Christians and banishing them from Constantinople – with the facilitation of Your Royal Majesty – the ancient Greek monarchy shall be restored on the ruins of the barbaric state being dominant here now; I would unconditionally guarantee the full sovereignty of the restored monarchy and put my younger grandson the Grand Duke Constantine on throne”. One of the elements of the “Greek Project” was the transformation of Bessarabia, Walachia, and Moldova into the state of Dacia, being independent of the Ottoman Empire, under the protectorate of Russia, serving as a buffer zone between Russia, Austria, and the Ottoman Empire. Should the project have appeared successful, Austria was promised vast territories in the Western Balkans. Naturally the joint plans of Russia and Austria found opposition from other powerful European states. England and Prussia were among those who actively urged Turkey to deliver a pre-emptive strike on Russia in order to disrupt its military preparations.
The relations between the Ottoman Empire and Russia turned from bad to worse. Russia instigated the Balkan lieges to riots that was a gross violation of the Kyuchuk-Kajnardzhi peace treaty. The empress Ekaterina II made a triumphant trip across the Crimea being accompanied by the representative of foreign courts and her ally, Josef II, Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire who travelled incognito. This event caused agitation of the public in Istanbul, revanchist sentiments emerged being supported by the statement of the British ambassador that Britain would support the Ottoman Empire in case it starts a war against Russia.
At the end of 1786 Ekaterina II decided to act in a more resolute manner. The Russian general Potemkin was assigned the command of troops and authorized to act at his own discretion. The Russian ambassador to Constantinople, Bulgakov, was assigned to claim the following:
1.The borders of the tsar of Georgia being in the allegiance to Russia shall not be disturbed by the Ottomans;
2. Runaway Russians shall not be allowed to stay in Ochakov but rather be expelled beyond the Danube;
3. The Kubans shall not assault the Russian borders.
The Ottoman Empire for its part required that Russia should give up its claims for Georgia, and cede 39 saline lakes in the area of Kinburn; the Ottoman state shall be granted the right to have consuls in Russian cities, particularly in the Crimea; the Ottomans shall have the right to examine ships sailing through the Bosporus strait; the Ottomans merchants shall pay a duty of no more than 3%, the Russian merchants shall not be allowed to export Ottoman masterpieces; and they shall not be allowed to employ Ottoman sailors on their ships. The Ottoman Empire required an urgent reply by August, 20 in 1787. Somewhat later the Ottoman Empire lodged a new claim – Russia shall quit the Crimea and return it to Ottomans and denounce all the treaties regarding the Crimea. When the Russian ambassador Bulgakov refused to accept such a claim he was injailed in the Seven Towers castle. That action was equal to the declaration of war. The Ottoman preparation for the war was unsatisfactory since the military reforms were not accomplished and the time selected was wrong as Russia and Austria entered into a military alliance. The Ottomans learnt it too late. Therefore the Ottoman Empire had to wage a war on two fronts. Moreover some of the Arab provinces had gained relative autonomy by that time and were governed by local rulers that refused to pay taxes to the treasury in Istanbul. Admiral Gazi Hasan-pasha had a successful expedition suppressing a rebellion in Egypt (1786-1787). However, due to a new war against Russia (1787-1792) he was forced to return to Istanbul and the rebellion was not completely suppressed.
A week after declaring war, the Ottoman fleet attacked two Russian vessels stationed by Kinburn and forced them to retreat to the firth. The attempts to conquer Kinburn that followed later were repelled by the 4,000 strong troops under the command of Suvorov. In Moldova field marshal Rumyantsev-Zadunajski severely defeated the Turkish army a few times, after Alexander Golitsyn occupied Iasi and Khotin. (Mayer Matthew Z. . The Price for Austria's Security: Part I. Joseph II, the Russian Alliance, and the Ottoman War, 1787-1789. The International History Review, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 257-299)
After a continuous siege by the troops of knyaz Potemkin and Suvorov Ochakov fell, the Turkish garrison was completely destroyed. The news heavily shocked sultan Abdul Khamid I and he died of a heart attack. What is so critical about the fortress port of Ochakov that its loss literally ruined the sultan? The Ottomans believed that Ochakov would help them to regain the Crimea. Ochakov locked access to the sea from the firth of the Dnieper where the Russians built the city of Herson. In some sources one would find the description of the fortress of Ochakov:
Ochakov featuring stone walls and towers was located on the steep cape of the upper coast of the Black Sea and the firth of the Dnieper. The waves washed its high walls where three hundred cannons were installed. In front of the old fortress engineering entanglements were organized – retrenchments, fosses, pitfalls, and in some places mines were planted (a sophisticated invention of the French engineers). Inside the fortress a small settlement was built — a labyrinth of narrow, oriental streets decorated here and there with minarets.
The Ottomans were pinning great hopes on Ochakov in their defensive moves. For this reason both parties attached a significant meaning to this city. Ekaterina II would describe Ochakov as a «natural Southern Kronstadt». Ochakov affected the development and the existence of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea and the defense of the Crimea.
Later, despite the significant advantage in manpower of the Ottoman fleet, the Russian Black Sea fleet under the command of rear admiral M.I.Voinovich defeated the Ottomans at Fidonisi (1788). ( Miller, W. . Europe and the Ottoman Power before the Nineteenth Century. The English Historical Review, Vol. 16, No. 63 (Jul., 1901), pp. 452-471) The initial successes of the Ottomans against the Austrians were followed by setbacks in the military actions against Russia. As a result of joint efforts of Russia and Austria the Ottoman Empire suffered one defeat after another both on land and sea: in Moldova and in the Balkans.
Still the Ottoman Empire hoped for a revanche. The campaign of 1790 started with a big setback of the Austrians: the Prince of Cobourg was defeated by the Ottomans at Zhurhza. Same year in February Josef II died, and his successor Leopold II, decided to start peace negotiations through the intermediary of England and Prussia. The congress was convened, however, the Russian empress refused to participate. (Jones, Robert E. . Opposition to War and Expansion in Late Eighteenth Century Russia. Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge, Bd. 32, H. 1 (1984), pp. 34-51).
The Ottoman government being encouraged by a favorable development decided to regain the Crimea and Kuban areas. However, in the Caucasus the Ottomans encountered misfortune: the corps of Batal-pasha landed at Anapa and advanced to Kabarda, but on September, 30 was defeated by the Russian General German. Naval activities in the Black Sea appeared disappointing again: their fleet was defeated twice (in June and August) by Russian admiral Ushakov. Then the fortresses of Kilya, Tulchia, and Iakchia fell one after another. However, the fortress of Izmail was defended by a large garrison kept and was seized by Russian general Suvorov on December, 11, after a gory assault.
The new sultan Selim III wanted to restore the prestige of his state before signing a peace treaty with Russia but the condition of the Ottoman army wouldn’t have enabled it. Finally the Ottoman Empire had to sign the Iasi peace treaty on January, 9, 1792. Under the terms of the peace treaty the Ottoman Empire confirmed the annexation of the Crimea and Kuban by Russia, as well as the Russian protectorate over Georgia. Vast areas between the Bug and the Dniester were annexed by Russia. Nevertheless Russia had to agree that the Ottoman Empire shall regain control over Bessarabia, Moldova, and Walachia. (Mayer Matthew Z. . The Price for Austria's Security: Part I. Joseph II, the Russian Alliance, and the Ottoman War, 1787-1789).
However some questions remain in the historical analysis. Why did the Russian Empire allow some compromise to Ottoman Empire while signing the peace treaty? The reason for such a result is linked to the disengagement of Austria in 1790 and involvement of the Russian Empire in a war against Sweden (1788-1790), as well as an explicitly hostile policy of England trying to create the anti-Russian coalition. The financial, material and human resources of the Russian Empire were strained to an extent that the empress was forced not to involve the state in multiple rounds of talks but rather agree to a compromise with the Ottomans.
Conclusion
This discussion is based on the different orientations and social advancement in different parts of the Ottoman Empire and considers the history of the Empire and its war with Russia in the late 18th century. Whereas France and England strengthened their influence on the Sultan government of the Ottoman Empire, and maintained the most extensive commercial interests in the Empire, the Russians tried to expand towards the Mediterranean and Black Sea. France and England were opposed to the liberation movements of the “oppressed nations” of the Ottoman Empire; and they also opposed the Russian advancement to the Black Sea and the Balkans. The essay presents not just a historical background, but an analysis, of the context of the war, emphasizing on the underlying dynamics of power and governance, of trade and commercial interests, unrest in Arab regions and the heightening rift between Britain and Russia.
In this context, the European trade interest of England and France is of significance as seen from the detailed discussion. England, France, Prussia wanted to support a strong Ottoman Empire, as they has commercial and trade interests in the region. European countries wanted to develop strong trade ties to further the economic boom of the British Empire. The Ottoman Empire was seen as a trade and commercial partner of the British Empire and a military ally. The Ottomans obtained and sought considerable help from the British in their war against Russia and this highlights a new international political dynamics.
The essay discussed the contributions of Abdul Khamid I who was one of the most successful traditionalist Ottoman reformers who strived to renew the Empire by restoring its ancient institutions. Abdul Khamid I created the new combat arms and equipped the army with modern weapons, reformed military operations, thus giving the Ottoman Empire its strong naval base (Wittek, Paul . The Rise Of The Ottoman Empire {Royal Asiatic Society Monographs, XXIII) Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland (1938)}. He also strived to modernize janissary corps and the navy, bringing in a new era of Turkish naval superiority. The discussion emphasized on how Ottoman seamen and officers were trained in the latest European techniques of conducting naval operations and the role of the French and British in training Ottoman navy. Despite these changes, there was a continued need for military and naval reforms in the Ottoman Empire.
Things took a different turn when in 1787 the Russians convinced the French to quit assisting the Ottomans and the reforms that were changing the outdated military and administrative systems within the Empire were no longer effective. With the signing of the Kyuchuk-Kajnardzhi peace treaty in 1774, Russia was granted the right to have the navy forces in the Black Sea and thus spread its influence across the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and Crimea. This treaty, as analyzed by historians has been unfavorable to the Ottoman Empire. Russians gained over the Turkish ally, France and found new ways to move into Turkish territory (Mayer Matthew Z. . The Price for Austria's Security: Part I. Joseph II, the Russian Alliance, and the Ottoman War, 1787-1789. The International History Review, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Jun., 2004), pp. 257-299).
Alongside Russia, the essay discussed the impact of the “Greek Project” , which is significant historically, as it aimed at the transformation of Bessarabia, Walachia, and Moldova into the state of Dacia, so that these could be independent of the Ottoman Empire, and under the protectorate of Russia, and serve as a buffer zone between Russia, Austria, and the Ottoman Empire.
The joint plans of Russia and Austria to invade the regions around the Ottoman Empire met with opposition from powerful European states of England and Prussia and they urged Turkey to deliver a pre-emptive strike on Russia to disrupt its military preparations. As the relationship between Turkey and Russia deteriorated, the Kyuchuk-Kajnardzhi peace treaty between the Ottomans and Russians was violated.
Among other claims, the Ottoman Empire claimed that Russia shall quit the Crimea and return it to Ottomans and denounce all the treaties regarding the Crimea. Without military reforms and strong joint opposition from Russia and Austria, the Ottoman Empire was in a weak position to wage war against Russia (Levy Avigdor. Military Reform and the Problem of Centralization in the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century. Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Jul., 1982), pp. 227-249). At this time the Arab provinces under the Ottoman Empire started to gain relative autonomy weakening the Empire even further. Despite the significant advantage in manpower of the Ottoman fleet, the Russian Black Sea fleet defeated the Ottomans at Fidonisi in 1788. Due to the joint efforts of Russia and Austria the Ottoman Empire suffered defeats both on land and sea, in Moldova and in the Balkans.
The Ottomans continued to fight back and in 1790 the Ottoman government was encouraged to regain the Crimea and Kuban areas. However defeat followed at the sea as the Ottoman naval operations were still inferior to Russians. The new sultan Selim III signed a peace treaty with Russia and under the treaty, the Ottoman Empire confirmed the annexation of the Crimea and Kuban by Russia, as well as the Russian protectorate over Georgia and vast areas were annexed and occupied by Russia. The Ottoman Empire however regained control over Bessarabia, Moldova, and Wallace and this control was significant increase terms of political and economic history of the region. Considering the hostile policy of England and Prussia against Russian expansion, the Russians were financially and materially strained and that is why they agreed to a quick compromise with the Ottomans.
This analysis provides a detailed historical background of the war in 1787, suggesting why the Ottoman Empire was weakened due to lack of military and naval reforms and how the Russians were also strained in terms of resources due to strong opposition from England, France and Prussia. Despite the joint efforts with Austria to expand beyond the Black sea, it can be said that both the Russians and the Ottomans have lost rather than gained from the 1787 war.
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